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WHIT MAN AND AMERICAN 
PERSONALISTIC PHILOSOPHY 
BERNARD SCHMIDT 
WHILE TRANSCENDENTALISM CLEARLY WAS the crowning product of the 
American Renaissance, its very prominence has created a critical myopia 
in the study of American philosophy of the mid-nineteenth century. For 
concurrent with the rise of Transcendentalism, another less prominent 
but extremely important philosophy was growing in New England: 
Personalism. This essay will demonstrate how American Personalism 
had its roots in Whitman's writing, and how it was basic to his thought. 
. A theistic form of idealism whose proponents consider the con-
scious, perceiving self the center of reality, Personalism maintains as its 
dominant concept that the intelligence of self explains theories, 
thoughts, and even God, who is usually considered a leader of active 
perceiving selves. Personalism therefore is a nonempirical philosophy in 
which the self obtains knowledge from a mighty power of reason, which 
is creative and can fashion reality from its own ideas. The self validates 
its perceptions from the physical world by subjecting them to its cre-
ative processes, but the physical world exists outside of the human mind 
and is not the product of a subjective idealism. In a cosmos where 
proud, potent selves possess powerful creative intelligence, each self 
earns from its peers respect for its abilities, and mutual respect creates 
the perfect intellectual and social milieu for democracy; tyranny be-
comes an aberration in a world of logical, productive selves. Americans 
have strongly influenced the evolution of Personalism, which holds that 
selves function in a concrete reality accessible to their perceptions and 
susceptible to their volitions. Whitman's democracy and optimism are 
generic to such a world. 
Personalism has been almost entirely overlooked by American lit-
erary critics and historians. It is strange indeed that Transcendentalism 
could so totally subsume a philosophy that was then potent and is now 
almost unknown, but that is what has happened. Logical Positivism and 
the philosophy of the sciences displaced the various forms of idealism 
for a good part of the twentieth century, but before this occurred, the 
Boston school of Personalism was formed. l Before most of the recog-
nized Personalists wrote and spoke about their doctrines, Bronson Al-
cott, an acknowledged leader of the Transcendentalists, was recording 
notes in his journal about his discussions of Personalism with Emerson, 
who looked with some disfavor on Alcott's Personalistic ideas. How-
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ever, Alcott was a popularizer and not the inventor, if there is to be such 
a person, of American Personalism. 
The American writer who first formally used the term "Personal-
ism" was Walt Whitman. On Thursday evening, April 30, 1868, he 
wrote to his mother that "I received today another letter from old Mr. 
Alcott-I sent him the Galaxy with Personalism-and he compliments 
me highly and speaks of Mr. Emerson too and his friendliness to me.,,2 
The article referred to here is profound in its historical, if not its 
philosophical meaning, for in spite of its multiplicity of badly developed 
and underdeveloped points, Whitman's "Personalism" is the manifesto, 
the clarion call, of the American Personalist movement. The publication 
of the article was given scant attention, consisting of little more than a 
vituperative review in the Round Table, which according to Edward F. 
Grier "was apparently intended to put down Whitman once and for 
all.,,3 That the author of "Personalism" was more than momentarily 
serious about his new concept is demonstrated by the fact that he 
inserted sections of this article and other documents into one of his best 
prose declarations, Democratic Vistas. According to Floyd Stovall, lines 
894 to 1275 of this work are filled with material taken from the older 
article, and certainly the reader may find frequent uses of the world 
"Personalism" elsewhere in Democratic Vistas, which was published in 
1871.4 
. The Galaxy article on Personalism needs to be examined not only 
for its modest contribution to the history of American philosophy, but, 
of equal significance, for its usefulness in understanding Whitman's 
thought and interpreting his poetry. Whitman lacked the dialectical skill 
and logical powers to make major contributions to the building of a 
system of philosophy. He could provide some seminal ideas for what 
was to become the American Personalistic movement, but his thoughts 
would never have the sweep or development of a Borden Parker Bowne, 
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, or Albert Cornelius Knudson, and that may 
be why none of the major commentators on American Personalism give 
Whitman credit for anything beyond introducing the term into Ameri-
can philosophy. 
Richard Chase's mention of Whitman's concern with the self as an 
independent unit which interacts with a complex world is accurate, but 
it must be pointed out that this cosmological view is Personalistic and 
may be traced back to Leibnizian monadology. In "The Monadology" 
Leibniz explains that simple entities are called "monads," and those 
which have strong powers of perception and memories are called 
"souls," a term which is here equated with "we" or selves. s Although 
the various selves have independence, they are irretrievably related 
within the limits of God's universe, and the action of each effects all its 
neighbors, be they near or far. Chase was correct in observing the 
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importance of Whitman's Personalism. From a study of Leibnizian 
monadology, it is safe to say that he was also correct in his observation 
that Whitman's" 'personalism' not only asserts the personal; it also, in 
some unspecified realm of being, 'fuses' men into 'solidarity,.,,6 As 
observations in a microcosmic situation where no philosophic pattern 
need be found, Chase's notes on Whitmanesque Personalism are sound. 
However, Whitman's world picture was part of the tradition of 
Personalism. His psychology is based on the existence of independent, 
highly complex selves. A democracy, the most perfect form of nation, is 
still an aggregate of individuals. When mankind is examined in any way 
or for any purpose, the unit of consciousness is the individual self. In 
this way Whitman avoids a total acceptance of Hegelian absolute ideal-
ism and its tendency to' accept a single, universal mind. In his article 
"Personalism," Whitman makes it clear that when the mind dwells on 
the blessings of abstract entities-such as democracy, philosophy, or 
even the omnipresent spirit of God - it should "reduce the whole matter 
to the consideration of a single self, a man or woman," for the critical 
unit in Whitman's Personalism is the "single solitary soul.,,7 Real 
intelligence and consciousness are derived from the individual self. No 
political entity or philosophy can dominate the self, which can be an 
element in a religious universe only when it is free of the artifices and 
conformity imposed by organized religion. 
Writing in 1908, Borden Parker Bowne showed just how central to 
Personalistic thought Whitman's psychology is. In "The Failure of 
Impersonalism," he claims that the self is more real than scientific 
abstractions; only the existence of the self is indubitable because it 
experiences a total awareness of its own consciousness, feelings, and 
reality. An abstraction just cannot do that. In attempting to establish or 
reflect the reality of the personality, scientific abstractions fail because 
deductions from "living experience" are our only true roads to 
knowledge. 8 In words that Whitman could well have written in his 
Galaxy article, Bowne pleads that "the personal life" or "the self-
conscious existence is the truly ultimate fact.,,9 . 
Mary Whiton Calkins, who like the great Boston Personalists was a 
professor and philosopher and who taught at Wellesley College in east-
ern Massachusetts, also defines Personalism in a way that makes Whit-
man's article seem seminal. If Whitman had lived in the early twentieth 
century when Personalism had already been well defined by Bowne and 
Knudson, his article "Personalism" might well have included Mary 
Calkins's cogent description of the self, the element common to his 
philosophy. She builds her concept of the self by comparing it to its less 
substantial counterpart in Phenomenalism, and the contrast seems to 
validate the Personalistic construct. Although Personalism and Phenom-
enalism both hold that reality can only be perceived by an omnipotent 
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consciousness, the Phenomenalist believes that consciousness is a con-
catenation of fleeting ideas. The Personalist believes that consciousness 
equals a self or person whose reality is made manifest by the fact that the 
person contains and controls ideas, which depend on his living con-
sciousness for their existence. 1O When in The Philosophy of Personalism 
Knudson defines Personalism as a form of idealism, "which finds in the 
conscious unity, identity, and free activity of personality the key to the 
nature of reality" (p. 87), he not only makes it clear that here is a 
philosophy centered around the intelligent potency of the self, he also 
continues the tradition in the United States that was initiated with 
Whitman's 1868 Galaxy article. 
Whitman's division of reality into a "Me" and "Not Me," his trust 
in the creative activity of the democratic poet to work the "Me" into an 
improved world, and his trust in "the interior consciousness," are 
strong points in a Personalistic psychology. 11 These are almost parallel 
to the four articles in Knudson's creed of Personalistic epistemology: 
"the dualism of thought and thing, or ideas and object, the creative 
activity of thought, the trustworthiness of reason, and the primacy of 
the practical reason.,,12 The latter two items do not debase the value of 
emotion, but this construct is not central to the immediate problem of 
simple cognition. For the most profound processes of knowing, all 
Personalists affirm that the affective facets of experience have deep 
meaning in the quest for knowledge and universal values.13 However, 
there is a real world beyond the self and its affections, and Personalism 
is not normally a form of subjective idealism. 
The "Me" and "Not Me" are fundamental to Whitman's episte-
mology. According to Marion Harris, the "Not Me" provides the ma-
terials for the "Me" to understand and is the second ingredient in the 
total of reality. The individual uses his senses to perceive nature or 
material existence, and then with the help of emotional insights he gains 
knowledge of the "internal spiritual world.,,14 Harris does not go on to 
attempt to label or catalogue the poet's philosophy. If Whitman's "Me" 
and "Not Me" were the only critical doctrine in his cosmos, he would 
be a dualistic realist. The realist knows points of actual existence outside 
his own consciousness; he acknowledges "Not Me" entities that do 
exist. The idealist forces reality to become synonymous with his own 
consciousness or perceptions. Whitman is realistic in his "Me" and 
"Not Me" Weltanschauung and idealistic in his Hegelian declarations. 
These latter statements tend to absolute monism and therefore lead 
critics like Thomas L. Brasher to conclude that Whitman is an idealistic 
monist, as is exemplified in Section 8 of "Passage to India" when the 
persona's soul "continually moves to join the vast oneness of God.,,15 
For the true Personalist, extreme absolute, idealistic monism (of the 
type of Josiah Royce or Hegel) allows the absolute or God to steal too 
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much independence and individuality from the basic selves. Although 
Personalism is primarily theistic, it considers the individual the prime 
organizer of his own perceptions, knowledge, and wisdom; the Person-
alist is never threatened by determinism. 
Whitman's "Me" and "Not Me" dualistic world picture thus must 
be reconciled with his admiration for the monistic Hegelian absolute. In 
Specimen Days he pays homage to Hegel and claims that this philosopher 
provides the best explanation of how to link the "Me, the human 
identity of understanding, emotions, spirit," and the "Not Me, the 
whole of the material objective universe and laws. ,,16 The explanation, 
which Whitman sees in a simplistic form in Schelling but fully devel-
oped in Hegel, is that the force that links the "Me" to the "Not Me" is 
the "endless process of creative thought," which emanates from both 
individual selves and an amorphous, moral cause or "permanent mo-
rale"; this latter entity accepts all of the impulses, thoughts, and mate-
rials in the universe, which flow to it as "rivers" to an ocean. 17 So the 
Hegelian absolute, the pride and the giory of absolute idealistic thought, 
is the conceptual glue which holds all of Whitman's "Me's" and "Not 
Me's" together. Leibnizian diversity and its establishment of various 
selves must be reconciled with Hegelian absolute idealism. 
It is tempting not only to the reader but to Whitman himself to give 
his absolute ideal realm a Platonic omnipotent reality in his metaphysi-
cal thought. In his article "Personalism," Whitman observes that self-
hood is religious and possesses the concept of the infinite. Each self 
realizes that: 
Finally, the theme, great as it is, of the Personality of mortal life is most important with 
reference to the immortal, the Unknown, the Spiritual, the only permanent real, which, 
as the ocean waits for and receives the rivers, waits for us each and all. I8 
As in Specimen Days, the selves are compared to rivers which flow to the 
ocean of an infinite absolute vastness, which is certainly a God-like 
entity. All of this seems to make Whitman's monistic absolute idealism 
official, but "Song of Myself," which is probably Whitman's most 
definitive statement of his occasionally contradictory beliefs, breathes 
forth an atmosphere, almost a dogma, that makes each individual self 
the center of the universe. When Whitman says that each person, each 
you, must take perceptions from "all sides and filter them from your 
self," 19 his epistemology may tend to associationalism - the idea that 
knowledge is empirical and originates in the senses, and that mental 
images are formed through a physical transmission of sensations. 
In Section 3 of "Song of Myself," Whitman tells the reader that 
"Clear and sweet is my soul, and clear and sweet is all that is not my 
soul. / Lack one lacks both, and the unseen is proved by the seen, / Till 
that becomes unseen and receives proof in its turn" of the other's reality 
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(52-54). The prime mover of this image is the soul or self which accepts 
the validity of the "not my soul" as being equal in importance to itself in 
the total harmony of the universe. "Lack one lacks both," and the 
subjective and objective worlds through mutual, reciprocal perceptions 
and interactions contribute to the other's reality and realization. In 
simple terms, the Platonic or Hegelian idealist longs to have his soul 
enter a world of ideal forms or form. His goal is to flee the environs of 
flesh and find the realm of spiritual beauty. For Whitman, the things of 
earth-the sweat, grass, prairie-dogs, breasts-are holy in a manner that 
is just not so for the idealistic monist. 
In this cosmological structure, the self is not a "river" or lesser 
entity that flows into an "ocean" or greater entity. Whitman's writings 
must be taken as parts of a whole and not always coherent ideological 
structure, but there are key themes that help the reader comprehend his 
mind-set. An organizing device around which is built the philosophy of 
Personalism, the self unites Whitman's dualistic and monistic worlds. 
Thus, one of the few titles which Whitman's mysterious cosmos can 
definitively be given is Personalistic. 
Whitman did not often bother to distinguish a less sophisticated 
entity or self from a more complex, sagacious entity or person, as did 
some other Personalists, but this actually serves to add unity and impact 
to his idea of selfhood. This selfhood, so evident in poems like "Song of 
Myself' or even the short "One's-Self I Sing," has definite Personalistic 
characteristics. 
When Whitman says "One's-Self I Sing, a simple separate person,/ 
Yet utter the word Democratic, the word En-Masse" (1-2), he is trans-
lating into poetic form his concept of the "Me" and "Not Me." As it is 
explained in Specimen Days, the "Me" is "human identity" or self, the 
subjective world, and the "Not Me" is the "whole of the material" 
world. 20 This establishes a certain modern realism in Whitman's epis-
temology; there is a real, independently existent world that needs to be 
perceived. This does not deprive the Whitmanesque poet of his power 
of "creative activity of thought" -a phrase coined by Knudson to 
describe the important ability of the mind to formulate its own reality. 21 
The poet in Whitman's world can attempt to force the "Not Me" to suit 
the will of "Me." In the Greek and Whitmanesque sense of the poet as 
maker or creator, the writer can "sing" into existence the perfect 
political reality of democracy, "breathing into it a new breath of life" 
and imparting to it permanence heretofore unavailable. 22 In this way, a 
national literature is created from "archetypal poems"; "the priest de-
parts, the divine literatus comes. ,,23 Personalistic thinkers accept the 
democratic society as the natural place for the self to prosper and grow. 
Emmanuel Mounier, the French Personalist, makes much of the need 
for a flexible environment for the personality to develop and sees any 
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form of tyranny as wrong. Like Whitman, Mounier tends to equate 
nondemocratic government with bad government. 
George Howison, who was a part of the Concord School of Philos-
ophy during the evening of the "Golden Day" of Transcendentalism, 
was one of the opponents of absolute idealism; he felt that Hegelianism 
nullified personality, morality, and individual choice and ultimately led 
to determinism. 24 However, in his credo for Personalism, which he calls 
Personal Idealism, he describes a cosmos that resonates with ideas 
similar to Whitman's in "Song of Myself." In both worlds pluralism 
deters a repressive monism because the individuality of all selves, Godly 
or not, is established by the fact that they perceive and think, a process 
essential to Personalism. A cosmic logic unites a "World of Spirits" and 
God into an "unmoved one that moves all things.,,25 Howison stresses 
the fact that God is not a solitary dictator, but a part of a world of selves 
that finds meaning and unity in its common moral impulse and latent 
power. Freedom, not determinism, is the welcome by-product of the 
willing interaction of the selves and God. When Knudson discusses the 
Personalistic view of the pluralistic and monistic aspects of reality, he 
suggests a monistic pluralism rather than Howison's pluralistic monism. 
In his urge to justify his theism, Knudson claims that there must be "a 
monism that transcends the dualism of thought and thing without 
destroying it. ,,26 Knudson's system is a monistic pluralism because in it 
the multitude of selves is strongly guided by a theistic force. However, 
the juxtaposition of Howison's and Knudson's Personalistic epistemo-
logical systems clarifies the basic tension between Whitma"n's Hegelian 
monistic cosmos and his pluralistic one, peopled by the supermen of 
democracy. 
It may well be that this tension will allow of no resolution, but the 
attempt may at least suggest a different way to analyze Whitman's 
writing and thought. The well-developed superman theme in "Song of 
Myself' may be explained as an outgrowth of Whitman's pluralistic 
tendencies. The individual selves and their wonderful abilities to create 
through thought are a given in his cosmos. A self that is a maker or 
creator cannot be accused of classical hubris. It is quite capable of 
conquering space and time and may logically claim, "I heard what was 
said of the universe, / Heard it and heard it of several thousand years" 
(1024-1025). This self comfortably and calmly studies the characteristics 
and capabilities of the mightiest gods of many different religions: 
Taking myself the exact dimensions of Jehovah, 
Lithographing Kronos, Zeus his son, and Hercules his grandson, 
Buying drafts of Osiris, Isis, Belus, Brahma, Buddha, 
In my portfolio placing Manito loose, Allah on a leaf, the crucifix engraved, 
With Odin and the hideous-faced Mexitli and every idol and image, 
Taking them all for what they are worth and not a cent more. . . . (1028-1032) 
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For the Whitmanesque self, there is no true arrogance in these state-
ments, and the persona of the poem consistently explains "the super-
natural of no account, myself waiting my time to be one of the su-
premes" (1049). In fact, in Section 48, Whitman explicitly states that 
"nothing, not God, is greater to one than one's self is" (1271). Man's 
self-consciousness organizes the world with his perceptions at the cen-
ter, and this is Personalistic. 27 
Another product or symptom of Whitman's Personalism is his view 
of nature. For Whitman, "Nature consists not only in itself, objectively, 
but at least just as much in its subjective reflection from the person, 
spirit, age, looking at it.,,28 Nature, then, is important only as it 
emanates from the individual; otherwise it is part of the "Not Me." 
That is why "the rule and demesne of poetry will always be not the 
exterior"; "not Nature but Man. ,,29 Howison says, "Man the spirit, 
man the real mind, is not the offspring of Nature, but rather Nature is 
in a great sense the offspring of this true Human Nature," also making 
the point that nature is, at least to some extent, the reflection of the 
perceiver's self. 30 
In Democratic Vistas Whitman describes three stages probably rep-
resenting a Hegelian scheme for thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which 
will lead to the establishment of his land of supermen or super Ameri-
cans, his "Religious Democracy.,,31 In the first stage the United States 
was planned and brought to life. The second stage saw material pros-
perity, and the third, in which priestcraft gives way to poetcraft, is yet 
to be achieved. In this last stage "the great literatus will be known 
among the rest by his cheerful simplicity, his adherence to natural 
standards, his limitless faith in God. ,,32 The second stage sees the 
triumph of science and materialism, not evils in themselves, but instru-
ments to be used in the struggle to build a world that fits the high 
standards of Personalistic values. Once again Whitman's Personalism 
may be read in the words of the Personalistic philosopher Howison, who 
asks that "men of science keep the method of science within the limits 
of science. ,,33 Science and religion need not be adversaries. However, 
science must explore only physical reality; it may conquer profane 
realms, but the sacred and the theological are not appropriate for its 
investigations. 
The Personalistic thinkers were often regarded as dreamers by the 
philosophers of science. In fact, they did tend to construct idealistic 
views of reality. However, thinkers like Whitman and Bowne main-
tained a healthy respect for science, without allowing that discipline to 
rule their thoughts. These men always sang the "Song of Myself' or 
other selves in their cosmological constructs. For this reason they were 
immune to the kind of error made by B.F. Skinner who, by mistaking 
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a methodology for a philosophy, ruthlessly seeks to destroy humanistic, 
mentalist constructs and to reduce man to an automaton moved only by 
determinants in his environment. There is a peculiar irony in this 
situation because the naivete shown by the scientist in accepting a part 
of reality as the whole is the kind of error that he would very likely 
attribute to the philosopher. The insistence that the human self is the 
real birthplace of knowledge and authority, which is assumed in the 
evolutionary theory of the three stages, is the reason that Whitman and 
other Personalists are interested in Christ as a model for human behav-
ior rather than as a deity; the religious creeds of other men mislead 
rather than lead the soul to the correct paths. The theistic democracy of 
the third stage of Whitman's evolutionary process is too spiritually pure 
to tolerate the machinations of partisan religious groups. 
All of the famous American Personalists of the late nineteenth or 
early twentieth century, from Bowne to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, give 
either minimal or no credit to Whitman as a precursor to their thoughts, 
so it is understandable that later critics should be unaware of his 
contribution. The Personalistic system builders refer to honored philos-
ophers like Leibniz and Kant, whom they claim as contributors to 
Personalism. When Edgar Sheffield Brightman says that "In the United 
States Walt Whitman stressed democratic aspects of Personalism," he is 
giving Whitman as much recognition as do any of the historians of 
Personalism;34 they have neither the time nor the inclination to recog-
nize the conceptual meanderings of an earthy American poet who was 
not lionized by the academic community of his day. 
During the "Golden Day" of American history, New England 
Transcendentalism-a point of confluence for Hindu, German, French, 
and American idealism-was the dominant American philosophy. Al-
though it was distinctly syncretic, it continued the intellectual stream 
that was to reach its high tide in Pragmatism, showed that at least an 
informal American philosophy could gain world fame, and, of even 
greater significance, was thoroughly and totally American. 
Personalism is not only inextricably linked to Transcendentalism 
through the Personalistic writing of Bronson Alcott, but it is pervasive 
in the literary mind of the United States. Men such as Francis Wayland 
Parker and John Dewey brought forth the Pragmatic educational theo-
ries, which demand that the selfhood of the child be the center of the 
educational process. Therefore, through the vehicle of Personalistic 
philosophy, future studies may show new relationships between such 
rarely compared works as Dewey's Democracy and Education and Whit-
man's Democratic Vistas. Personalistic emphasis on the self as the creator 
or organizer of reality also suggests a link with Existentialism. Wherever 
the Personalistic path leads, it should not be forgotten that there was a 
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distinct philosophical school that formally began with Whitman's article 
"Personalism. " 
Saint Augustine's College 
NOTES 
Borden Parker Bowne was the first and most significant leader of the Boston school of 
Personalism. The other important proponent of American Personalism in the nineteenth 
century was George Holmes Howison, but he founded neither a system nor a school. 
Teaching at the University of California for the greater part of his career, he was isolated 
from the New England theocratic intellectualism in which Bowne's thoughts flourished 
and lived on (see Joseph L. Blau, Men and Movements in American Philosophy [Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; 1952], p. 189). Bowne reacted against the positivism of 
his day by rigorously affirming the self as the omniscient perceiver of reality. To 
demand that the self be taken as an entity whose existence needed to be scientifically 
verified was naive. Common sense showed that the self was the primary agent of 
verification. That conscious experience created the only true reality was the basic idea of 
Bowne's "Transcendental Empiricism" (Blau, p. 201). 
Bowne taught his doctrines at Boston University from 1876 until his death in 1910. 
His pluralistic idealism and Personalistic theism were carried forward by three promi-
nent students; two, like Bowne, also taught at Boston University. Albert Knudson 
published The Philosophy of Personalism (New York: Abingdon Press, 1927), and this 
comprehensive study is the definitive history of Personalism. In cogent books, articles, 
and lectures, Edgar Sheffield Brightman successfully continued Bowne's attempt to 
systemize and explain Personalism. Ralph Tyler Flewelling, like Howison, took the 
movement west. Flewelling founded the journal, The Personalist, at the University of 
Southern California. (See John H. Lavely, "Personalism," The Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, ed. Paul Edwards [New York: Macmillan, 1967], 6:109.) 
2 Edwin Haviland Miller, ed., The Correspondence (New York: New York University 
Press, 1961), 2:30-31. 
3 Edward F. Grier, "Walt Whitman, The Galaxy, and Democratic Vistas," American 
Literature 23 (November 1951), 347. 
4 Floyd Stovall, ed., "Democratic Vistas," Prose Works (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 1964), 2:390-391. Hereafter abbreviated PW. 
5 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "The Monadology," The Rationalists, trans. George 
Montgomery (New York: Dolphin Books, 1960), 458. 
6 Chase describes Whitman's Personalism as a synonym for "identity," but he does not 
note that Whitman's key word initiates a philosophical system, thereby leaving what he 
calls Whitman's "new urgency" and "new clarity" only partially explained. See Richard 
Chase, "The Theory of America," Walt Whitman Reconsidered (New York: William 
Sloane Associates, 1955), 159-163. 
7 Walt Whitman, "Personalism," The Galaxy 5 (1868), 541. 
8 Borden Parker Bowne, "The Failure of Impersonalism," The Development of American 
Philosophy, ed. Walter Muelder, et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 284. 
9 Bowne, 284. 
189 
10 Mary Whiton Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 
1923), 406-409. 
11 Whitman "Personalism," 544. 
12 Knudson, 99. 
13 Knudson, 155. 
14 Marion Harris, "Nature and Materialism: Fundamentals in Whitman's Epistemol-
ogy," Walt Whitman Review 9 (December 1963), 88. 
15 Thomas L. Brasher, "A Modest Protest against Viewing Whitman as Pantheist and 
Reincarnationist," Walt Whitman Review 13 (September 1967), 93. 
16 PW, 1:258. 
17 PW, 1:259. 
18 Whitman, "Personalism," 547. 
19 Harold W. Blodgett and Scully Bradley, eds., Leaves of Grass: Comprehensive 
Reader's Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973),30. All quotations from Whitman's 
poems are from this source. 
20 PW, 1:258. 
21 Knudson, 96. 
22 PW, 2:365. 
23 PW, 2:365. 
24 George Holmes Howison, George Holmes Howison: Philosopher and Teacher, ed. John 
Buckham and George Stratton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934), 126. 
25 Howison, 130. 
26 Knudson, 153. 
27 James T.F. Tanner says that Whitman's superman once again places man at the 
center of the universe from which he was driven by science: he describes the poet's 
belief in a superman as a "personal humanism." So Tanner touches on a Personalistic 
note in Whitman's thoughts, but does not study Whitman as a Personalist. See James 
T.F. Tanner, "The Superman in Leaves of Grass," Walt Whitman Review 11 (December 
1965), 96. 
28 PW, 2:485. 
29 PW, 2:485. 
30 Howison, 185. 
31 PW, 2:410. 
32 PW, 2:414. 
33 Howison, 189. 
34 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Personalism," A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. 
Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), 343. 
190 
